MRMC-CAN: A Method to Improve Real-Timeness and Response Time of CAN

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Abstract— **Although the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) has made great improvements in factory automation, there are still many challenges in meeting the response time and reliability requirements of IIoT communications. These challenges are because of the need for real-time communications in an industrial environment with high electromagnetic interferences. To meet these challenges, in the context of real-time industrial device communications, Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol is commonly employed, which is noise resistance, nevertheless, the presence of a faulty node in CAN networks can lead to deadline violation of messages and timing failure. In this paper, to control the behavior of nodes, message retransmission is performed based on the criticality of message reception (MRMC-CAN). The proposed method in comparison with standard CAN and WCTER-based approaches reduces consumed bandwidth by an average of 10.5% and 4.4%, respectively. Moreover, the proposed technique improves response time in comparison with standard CAN by an average of 36.19%.**

Keywords: Controller Area Network (CAN), Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), Real-Timeness, Reliability, Error Handling.

I. INTRODUCTION

The CAN communication protocol was designed in the 1980s by Robert Bosch for the vehicular internal network. This communication protocol is one of the most employed communication protocols in vehicular networks due to its low implementation cost and its fault-tolerant behavior against network errors [1]. Today this communication protocol is employed in other industrial fields and IIoT in addition to vehicular internal networks [2, 3].

IIoT systems are safety-critical in nature [4]. These systems require error handling and real-timeness in their communication [5, 6]. However, since in the CAN communication protocol, to deal with communication errors, the corrupted message is retransmitted after any type of error detection, and given that this communication protocol employs the carrier sense multiple access with collision detection (CSMA/CD), retransmission of messages conflicts with real-time constraint required in the safety-critical systems [7].

There are five different types of errors in the CAN communication protocol, including Bit Error, Stuff Error, Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) Error, Form Error, and acknowledgment error. Among these errors, CRC Error is detected by receiver nodes if there are any differences between received and computed CRC, and the acknowledgment Error is detected by the sender node if this node does not receive any acknowledgment from the receiver nodes.

In the CAN communication protocol, the correctness of message reception is determined by the content of the ACK field. As shown in Fig. 1, the ACK field consists of the ACK slot and ACK diameter. The sender node leaves the ACK slot recessive and waits for acknowledgment. The correct reception of messages will have acknowledged after CRC checking, by changing the ACK slot to dominant by each receiver node. If the ACK slot does not change to dominant, it means that an incorrect message is detected by all receiver nodes. In this case, the sender node detects acknowledgment error, and retransmit the unacknowledged frame.



Figure 1. CAN ACK field format

Although the acknowledgment process employed in the CAN communication protocol assures the sender that the message has been received correctly by all nodes, the dominant bit sent in the ACK slot by one of the receiver nodes which detects the correctness of the received message, prevents the sender node from identifying the nodes that received the message incorrectly. In such a situation, as shown in Fig. 2, the sender's ignorance of which nodes received the message incorrect prevents the sender node from making the right decision about the need to retransmit the unacknowledged frame.



Figure 2. Acknowledgment Process

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Any node which detects CRC Error will issue an error flag to notify the sender node about incorrect reception of the message. As shown in Fig. 3, although sending an error frame notifies the sender node about incorrect reception, recovery time from detecting an error until the start of the next message is 18-bit times and can be at most 31-bit times [8]. Therefore, to improve the real-timeness of the CAN network, in this paper, the MRMC-CAN technique is presented. This technique gives the sender node the knowledge of which nodes did not receive the message correctly. This knowledge allows the sender node to decide whether retransmit the message or not.



Figure 3. Bit sequence after CRC Error detection

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related studies are investigated in Section II, then the proposed technique is illustrated in Section III. The response time is presented in Section IV. Section V describes the experimental results and evaluation, and finally, the conclusion is presented in Section VI.

II. Related Studies

Since non-violation of message deadlines and timing verification is the key to ensuring vehicle safety during the design phase [9], papers [10, 28] focus on the CAN worst-case response-time improvement through consumed bandwidth reduction. CAN worst-case response-time is defined as the longest time taken for messages to reach their destinations, which is measured relative to the arrival time of messages [10].

One way to reduce bandwidth consumption is to prevent an offending node from connecting to the CAN network. Network Guardian (NG) is commonly employed to prevent babbling idiot failure which is caused by offending nodes [11], [12]. Although employing NG prevents the high bandwidth overhead caused by faulty nodes, the level of babbling that NG prevents the node from sending a message to the network is the same for all messages. For this reason, an analysis for the Guardian-based approach is presented in [13]. In this analysis, the number of retransmission of a message is determined based on the criticality level of the messages.

In addition to methods that prevent high traffic consumption due to faulty nodes, others [14, 17] prevent fault propagation from one subnet to the others by changing the linear topology of the CAN network. In [14] by changing the topology of the CAN network, the RedCAN is presented. In RedCAN, after detecting physical defects in one sector to prevent fault propagation, other nodes disconnect this sector and employ a redundant sector. Also, Barranco and Proenza [15] propose an active star topology, called CANcentrate. In CANcentrate central hub, prevents fault propagation. Although CANcentrate prevents communication network failure, its active star topology hub represents a single point of failure. As a result, they present replicated active star topology called ReCANcentrate which is based on the hardware redundancy of the hub [16]. Moreover, in [17] a shared clock algorithm named TTC-SC6 was proposed which ensures that fault on one link of the star network cannot propagate to the rest of the network via port disablement.

In contrast, a series of papers [18, 25], reduce bandwidth consumption through data reduction (DR) techniques. In DR techniques, the compression process is as follows, first a message with the identifier ID' is sent at t=t', then the subsequent messages with ID' sent at t=t'+1 based on signals' differences [18]. In the DR technique presented in [19], the first byte of the compressed data frame is assigned to data compression code (DCC). Each bit of DCC indicates whether or not one byte of the data frame is compressed. In [20] Adaptive DR (ADR) technique is presented. In ADR DCC is based on signals instead of bytes. Also, ADR prevents the current frame from being transmitted if it does not differ from the previous one.

Although ADR reduces the bandwidth consumption, in this technique, if the value of one of the signal differences exceeds the assigned data field, the whole message will be sent uncompressed. Therefore, in [21], the improved ADR (IADR) technique is presented. In this method, it is possible to send a combination of compressed and uncompressed signals in one message. Moreover, [18] proposes Enhanced DR (EDR) technique, considering the overhead caused by DR techniques and its effect on the bit length of the compressed message. In EDR, a signal is sent compressed if it does not increase the length of the compressed message compared to the uncompressed message.

Assign Data field to signals based on the predicted maximum bit length of signal differences (e.g., in the boundary of fifteen compression technique (BFC) [22], a signal is compressed if its corresponding signal difference is within the maximum compression range of ±15 bits.) affect the performance of DR techniques [21, 23]. Therefore, Wu and Chung proposed efficient CAN DR (ECANDC) [23], and improved CAN DR (ICANDR) [24] techniques based on signal rearrangement algorithms (SRA). In these techniques, compression area selection (MAP) is employed to eliminate the prediction of the maximum signal differences bit length. In the ICANDR technique, the CAN data field, divided into 24, 24, and 16-bit length subfields. Each combination of signal mapping to these subfields results in different compression efficiency. In [25] a CAN data arrangement algorithm was proposed to maximize compression efficiency.

In addition to DR techniques, others reduce bandwidth consumption by minimizing stuffing-bit. In the CAN network non-return to zero (NRZ) coding is employed to ensure synchronization of all nodes. In this coding, an opposite polarity bit is inserted after five consecutive bits with the same polarity. Although bit stuffing is a fault-tolerant mechanism in CAN that synchronizes all nodes, stuffing-bits can cause a 22% overhead in the worst-case [26]. For this reason, Park and Kang

propose a bit stuffing mechanism based on XOR masking to minimize stuffing bits and prevent priority inversion [26]. In their mechanism, messages are divided into m groups, each of them contains n identifiers. In this mechanism first XOR mask is initialized to "1010…", then one is assigned to the $1 + [log_2 m]$ most significant bits and zero is assigned to the $[log_2 m]$ bits of the XOR mask to prevent priority inversion.

Another category of real-timeness improvement and consumed bandwidth reduction techniques is based on error correction and prevention of message retransmission. In [7], the dual CRC error correction (DUCER) technique was proposed, which employs a redundant communication channel and lightweight error correction software scheme, which can correct 5-bit errors. Classification of real-timeness improvement techniques shows in Fig. 4.



Figure 4. Classification of Methods for Real-Timeness Improvement of CAN Network

III. Proposed Method

As mentioned earlier, corrupted messages are retransmitted in the CAN communication protocol to deal with communication errors, whereas, message retransmission conflicts with the real-time requirements of safety-critical systems. For this reason, in this paper the MRMC-CAN is presented, In MRMC-CAN decision to retransmission is made at the receiver nodes. For this purpose, receiver nodes control the message retransmission by controlling error flag propagation based on the criticality of receiving a message. The criticality of receiving a message is determined based on a list of critical IDs defined in each node.

Although message retransmission based on the decision of receiving nodes improve response time and reduce consumed bandwidth, this decision is made based on the ID that may be received incorrectly. Therefore in MRMC-CAN, the arbitration field of CAN messages (as shown in Fig. 5), is divided into two parts including reduced ID (RID) and ID-CRC. ID-CRC allows the receiver nodes to make sure that the received ID is correct.



Figure 5. MRMC-CAN Arbitration Field

As shown in Fig. 6 MRMC-CAN includes Criticality detection (CD), and Error Flag Transmission Control (EFTC) modules, to give receiver nodes the ability of decision making about the need for message retransmission. The CD module monitors the CAN-RX signal of the standard CAN controller and checks whether the received ID matches with the list of critical IDs or not. If the message ID matches with the list of critical IDs, and if received CRC-ID is equal to the calculated CRC-ID, the CD module detects the criticality of receiving this message, and the *criticality* signal goes high. The implementation of this module is shown in Fig. 7.



Figure 6. Block Diagram of MRMC-CAN



Figure 7. Implementation of Criticality Detection Module

Once the criticality of receiving the message has been detected by the CD module, the receiver node must control the propagation of its error flags. For this purpose, if the reception of a received message is critical, and an error detected, the

receiver node must propagate error flags, otherwise, it must be prevented from error flag propagation. Although preventing error flag propagation due to the incorrect reception of non-critical messages will reduce bandwidth consumption and increase the real-timeness of the CAN network, it causes Bit Error in the receiving node that was prevented from error flag propagation. In CAN nodes, a Bit Error is detected when the value of the monitored bit differs from the transmitted bit. To resolve this issue, if a receiver node, receives an erroneous non-critical message, in addition to preventing it from error flag propagation, the CAN-TX signal must be routed to the CAN-RX signal, until an ongoing message is transmitted. In MRMC-CAN, the EFTC module controls error flag propagation. As shown in Fig. 8, the EFTC module is implemented with one flip-flop two multiplexers, one AND gate, and an OR gate.



Figure 8. Implementation of EFTC Module

As shown in Fig. 9, disconnecting the receiver node that received an erroneous non-critical message, creates a silence interval. During this interval, the disconnected node must be prevented from transmitting its messages. Therefore, the standard CAN transmission procedure must be changed as Fig. 10.



Figure 9. Silence Interval



Figure 10. MRMC-CAN Message Transmission Flowchart

IV. Response Time Analysis

In the industrial context, the response time has a direct impact on the correctness of operations, therefore determining whether or not a message can be transmitted on its deadline is important, at design time. For this reason, in [10, 27], the first timing analysis of the CAN networks called Tindell's analysis was presented. In Tindell's analysis, the worst-case response time of messages is determined by parameters including jitter, worst-case queuing delay, and required transmission time. Since the effect of error events was not considered in Tindell's Analysis, it is modified by Davis and Burns [28], assuming that the maximum number of errors on the bus at time interval t' is given by function F (t). Although in the analysis proposed by Davis and Burns, the effect of errors on the worst-case response time is considered, but their analysis is not sufficient to examine the worst-case response time of the MRMC-CAN method.

For this reason, in this paper, Tindell's analysis is modified by considering the probability of erroneous message reception in a node for which this reception is critical. In this analysis, it is assumed that the system is composed of periodic and sporadic messages, which are enqueued at periodic or minimum time intervals, and a message M_i is characterized by an 8-tuple: $\langle id_i, m_i, D_i, T_i, J_i, Pe_i, Pea_i, Pecn_i \rangle$. Where in this tuple id_i is the identifier, m_i is payload length, D_i is the deadline, T_i is transmission period or minimum time interval, and J_i is jitter of periodic messages. In Tindell's analysis, the maximum message transmission time C_i is determined by

considering the stuffing bit with Equation 1, where τ_{bit} is the transmission time of one bit.

$$C_i = \left(\left\lfloor \frac{34+8m_i}{5} \right\rfloor + 47 + 8m_i \right) \tau_{bit} \quad (1)$$

Equation (1) gives the maximum message transmission time if the probability of error occurrence during message transmission Pe_i is zero, otherwise, the maximum transmission time Ce_i^{max} can be found iteratively through (2). Starting value of this recurrence relation is $Ce_i^{(0)} = C_i$ and iterates until m=16 because a node enter the error-passive state after a maximum of 16 times erroneous message transmission.

$$Ce_i^{(n+1)} = (1 - Pe_i) Ce_i^{(n)} + Pe_i (2Ce_i^{(n)} + 23) \quad (2)$$

Equation (2) specifies the maximum message transmission time for Standard-CAN, however for MRMC-CAN, the probability of error occurrence in the arbitration field Pea_i , and the probability of erroneous message reception in a node for which this reception is critical $Pecn_i$ must be considered as in (3).

$$Ce_{e_i}^{(n+1)} = (1 - Pe_i) Ce_i^{(n)} + Pe_i Pea_i ((1 - P_{ecn}) Ce_i^{(n)} - 23Pecn_i + 55) + Pe_i Pecn_i (Ce_i^{(n)} + 23) \quad (3)$$

After obtaining the maximum transmission time, the blocking time B_i, which is caused by messages by higher priority than M_i, is calculated through (4). Then the worst-case queueing delay is obtained through the iterative relation of (5). This recurrence relation starts by $W_i^{(0)} = B_i$ and iterates until $W_i^{(m+1)} = W_i^{(m)}$. The worst-case response time of message M_i, is given by $W_i^{(m)}$.

$$B_i = \max_{k \in hp(i)} (C_k^{\max}) \quad (4)$$

$$W_i^{(n+1)} = B_i + \sum_{k \in hp(i)} \left\lceil \frac{W_i^{(n)} + J_k + \tau_{bit}}{T_k} \right\rceil C_k^{\max} \quad (5)$$

V. Implementation and Evaluation

In this section, MRMC-CAN is implemented and evaluated. First, an employed fault injector is introduced, then MRMC-CAN is implemented as hardware-based on FPGA and software-based on ARM Cortex M0. Then, to evaluate the real-timeness improvement of the proposed method, the response-time and consumed bandwidth are analyzed, and to evaluate the overhead of proposed method parameters including area overhead, hardware utilization, and ROM and RAM usage are evaluated.

A. Prototype Implementation and Simulation

Since in the proposed method receiver nodes make a decision about message retransmission, the evaluation must be done through individually fault injection to each node. Therefore fault injection was performed based on Independent Fault Injector (IFI) [29]. As shown in Fig. 11, this fault injector is implemented with one CAN Transceiver, fault injector controller, and a multiplexer for each node. Fault injector controller receives fault injection command through RS232 interface.



Figure 11. Modified IFI Fault Injector Diagram

To simulate and verify the proposed method, the CAN network implemented as shown in Fig. 12 and Fig. 13. In this implementation, Node 1 has a software-based MRMC-CAN implemented on ARM Cortex M0 (STM32F030), Node 2 has a hardware-based MRMC-CAN implemented on Xilinx Spartan6 (6SLX9TQG144), and Node 3 has a standard CAN Controller. In this Network IFI fault injector is implemented with a 74HC153 and one Arm Cortex M0 as IFI Controller.

To simulate the implementation, a PC-based logic analyzer is employed. In the simulation fragment of Fig. 14-a, Node1 transmits a message with an identifier (ID'), which matches with the critical identifier list of Node 2. During this message transmission, fault injected to Node 2, as a result, MRMC-CAN allows Node 2 to transmit error flag. In contrast, in the simulation fragment of Fig. 14-b, Node 1 transmits a message with the identifier (ID''), which is none-critical for Node2, and during this message transmission, fault is injected to Node 2. In this situation, Node 2 prevented error flag propagation.



Figure 12. CAN Network Diagram



Figure 13. CAN Network Implementation

Figure 14. MRMC-CAN error transmission permission simulation

B. *Response Time and Consumed Bandwidth*

In this section, response time and consumed bandwidth of MRMC-CAN were evaluated in comparison with standard CAN and WCTER-based approaches [13, 30]. In WCTER-based methods, mixed-criticality levels are considered for message set, and the possibility of message retransmission in event of an error is determined based on these levels. The benchmark message set for this evaluation is generated by NetCarBench [31]. However, since this tool does not support the criticality of message reception, it should be modified to generate message sets as Table I. After generating the benchmark message sets, the test board is implemented as shown in Fig. 15 and Fig. 16. In this test board, Electronic Control Units (ECU) and software-based MRMC-CANs were implemented on ARM Cortex M3 and ARM Cortex M0 microcontrollers respectively.

The overall response time and consumed bandwidth evaluation process are as follows. Firstly, each ECU employs its internal timer to transmit its message based on the periods defined in the message set benchmark. Secondly, the IFI fault injector controller injects faults to the nodes based on the received command from the PC. Finally, response time is obtained by recording the time it takes for messages to reach their destinations, and consumed bandwidth is obtained based on how long the bus is occupied per unit time. Results of the evaluation are presented in Fig. 17 and Fig. 18. As shown in Fig. 17 the MRMC-CAN method in comparison with standard CAN and WCTER-based approaches improves Consumed bandwidth by an average of 10.5% and 4.4% respectively, and also as shown in Fig. 18 proposed method improves response time in comparison with standard CAN by an average of 36.19%.

TABLE I. MESSAGE SET CREATED BY MODIFIED NETCARBENCH

Node 1							
IDD	***payload***	***Period***	***Deadline***	***Must Receive By Node***			
				1	***2***	***3***	***4***
241	8	20	10	□	■	■	□
738	8	2000	20	□	□	□	■
248	8	20	5	□	□	■	■
Node 2							
IDD	***payload***	***Period***	***Deadline***	***Must Receive By Node***			
				1	***2***	***3***	***4***
787	8	1000	10	■	□	□	□
306	4	50	25	■	□	■	□
455	8	100	30	□	□	□	■
Node 3							
IDD	***payload***	***Period***	***Deadline***	***Must Receive By Node***			
				1	***2***	***3***	***4***
215	8	20	10	■	□	□	■
Node 4							
IDD	***payload***	***Deadline***	***Deadline***	***Must Receive By Node***			
				1	***2***	***3***	***4***
523	8	100	5	□	■	■	□



Figure 15. Diagram of Test Board



Figure 16. Implementation of Test Board



Figure 17. Consumed Bandwidth



Figure 18. Response Time

C. *Area OverHead and Utilization*

The overall area overhead of hardware-based MRMC - CAN modules are represented in Table II. In this table, the hardware size is given in terms of two-input NAND gate count. In addition to area overhead, Table III shows the device utilization of hardware-based MRMC-CAN modules in Xilinx Spartan 6. Moreover to show the software implementation capability of the proposed method in a microcontroller with limited resources, the ROM, RAM usage of the proposed method is shown in Table IV.

TABLE II. AREA OVERHEAD OF MRMC-CAN MODULES

	Number of Gates	Overheads (%)
Basic CAN Controller	20643	-
Active MRMC	111	0.5

TABLE III. HARDWARE BASED MRMC DEVICE UTILIZATION FOR 6SLX9TQG144

	Used	Available	Utilization
Global Buffers	1	16	6.25 %
Function Generators	111	5720	1.94 %
Dffs or Latches	79	11440	0.69 %

TABLE IV. SOFTWARE BASED MRMC ROM, RAM USAGE FOR STM32F030F4PX

	Used	Available	Usage
RAM	29	4096	0.7 %
ROM	5024	16384	30.7 %

VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS

Although CAN communication protocol, is employed in industrial fields, due to its low-cost implementation, low response time and noise robustness, the temporal redundancy feature of this protocol makes it vulnerable to timing-failure. Since real-time capability is an essential requirement for IIoT Communications, this paper presents the MRMC-CAN method in which message retransmission is performed based on the criticality of message reception. Message retransmission based on the criticality of message reception improves the real-timeness of CAN protocol by preventing message retransmission in the event of receiving an incorrect message in nodes that receiving of this message is not critical. The MRMC-CAN method in comparison with standard CAN and WCTER-based approaches reduces consumed bandwidth by an average of 10.5% and 4.4% respectively and improves response time in comparison with standard CAN by an average of 36.19%.

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