For common pool resources, to be sustainable, property right regimes are known as the most important driver to explain how such resources are exploited by the resource users to govern a better livelihood. Using the bundle of rights defined by Ostrom, common property regimes can be shaped differently. This fact is more obvious when it comes to real situations which might be rare to find common pool systems where all people in a group hold similar rights. It can be seen in terms of quality (the type of rights) and quantity (the number of rights). This qualitative study aimed at identifying different property regimes holding different combinations of property rights among various groups of pastoralists in Semnan province, Iran. The study was conducted in the two counties of this province; namely Damghan and Semnan. Some representatives of the pastrolaists’ groups were interviewed by an open-ended questionnaire. The results made it clear that there exist four main sub-groups under the common property regime (CPR); i.e., ”mini CPR within CPR”, “CPR with rotational rule”, “limited open access” and “CPR with a unique decision”. The sub-groups were found differently in terms of the level of cooperation in managing their common resources. While the sub-group of “CPR with a unique decision maker” showed the highest level of cooperation, the “unlimited open access” comprised the lowest level. The study furthermore concluded that the higher the level of cooperation within the groups is, the less over exploitation is expected over the rangelands that can result in a more sustainable livelihood for the pastoralists.Keywords: Common pool resources, Common property right regimes, Sustainable livelihood, Rangeland management.

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