Title : ( Antitrust Auditing, Commitment and Leniency Program: A Laboratory Evidence )
Authors: Bernard Richter ,
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Abstract
Through an experiment, this paper examines which effects an endogenous antitrust agency, that has the possibility to decide upon probability of investigation, has on cartel deterrence, stability and pricing behavior. For a repeated Bertrand pricing game, we found that introducing leniency program, o¤ering legal immunity through ne reductions for whistle-blowing on a cartel, by endogenous antitrust agency is a bad news in terms of cartel power reduction and tacit cartel duration and good news in the sense of number and stability of explicit cartels, and number and duration of newly formed cartels after they have been caught.
Keywords
, Antitrust, Leniency, Cartels
@inproceedings{paperid:1039916,
author = {Bernard Richter},
title = {Antitrust Auditing, Commitment and Leniency Program: A Laboratory Evidence},
booktitle = {the 2nd Workshop on the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property and Competition Law},
year = {2011},
location = {استانبول},
keywords = {Antitrust; Leniency; Cartels},
}
%0 Conference Proceedings
%T Antitrust Auditing, Commitment and Leniency Program: A Laboratory Evidence
%A Bernard Richter
%J the 2nd Workshop on the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property and Competition Law
%D 2011
