Title : ( Optimal Cartel Penalty Regime with History Dependency )
Authors: Mehdi Feizi ,
Full TextAbstract
In this paper, we develop a model to study a dynamic enforcement game between an antitrust authority and several firms. Our main result is that the stylized European penalty legislation appears not to be as efficient as it could be, in the sense that fully compliant behavior is not the long-run steady-state equilibrium of the model. Furthermore, we suggest a penalty regime which depends both on the infringement’s duration and the amount of law enforcement, and could prevent any collusion at all.
Keywords
, Antitrust Policy, Cartel, Pricing Schema, Differential Game, Commitment.
@inproceedings{paperid:1039917,
author = {Feizi, Mehdi},
title = {Optimal Cartel Penalty Regime with History Dependency},
booktitle = {Workshop on Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications},
year = {2011},
location = {Paris, french},
keywords = {Antitrust Policy; Cartel; Pricing Schema; Differential Game; Commitment.},
}
%0 Conference Proceedings
%T Optimal Cartel Penalty Regime with History Dependency
%A Feizi, Mehdi
%J Workshop on Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications
%D 2011
