The Iranian model of kidney transplantation (IMKT) is an example of a legal system of compensated, living, and unrelated renal donation. This study demonstrates its heterogeneity regarding prerequisites, restrictions, and policies for matching donors and recipients with an emphasis on the case of Mashhad, in which the Iranian Kidney Foundation (IKF) received criticism about the kidney market. The IKF in Mashhad strives to prevent the poor from imprudently selling their own kidneys by informing them about the consequences of a kidney transplant, resolving their financial needs, and imposing several legal obstacles before a transplant is allowed. We show that the IMKT does not fully eliminate excess demand for kidneys, although it significantly decreases demand so that Iran has the shortest waiting list in the world. Nevertheless, the relative number of kidney transplants, especially from deceased donors, are higher in Mashhad compared to the average of other centers in Iran, as almost forty percent of renal patients on the active waiting list get a kidney each year.

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