Title : ( Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: Two impossibility results )
Authors: Rasoul Ramezanian , Mehdi Feizi ,
Full TextAbstract
A random assignment is robust ex-post Pareto efficient whenever for any of its lottery decomposition, each deterministic assignment in its support is Pareto efficient. We show that ordinal efficiency implies robust ex-post Pareto efficiency while the reverse does not hold. We know that strategy-proof and ordinal efficient mechanisms satisfy neither equal treatment of equals nor equal division lower bound. We prove that it is not possible to avoid these two impossibilities by weakening ordinal efficiency to robust ex-post Pareto efficiency.
Keywords
, random assignment problem; robust ex, post Pareto efficiency; equal treatment of equals; equal division lower bound.
@article{paperid:1092468,
author = {Ramezanian, Rasoul and Feizi, Mehdi},
title = {Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: Two impossibility results},
journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
year = {2022},
volume = {135},
month = {September},
issn = {0899-8256},
pages = {356--367},
numpages = {11},
keywords = {random assignment problem; robust ex-post Pareto efficiency; equal treatment of equals; equal division lower bound.},
}
%0 Journal Article
%T Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: Two impossibility results
%A Ramezanian, Rasoul
%A Feizi, Mehdi
%J Games and Economic Behavior
%@ 0899-8256
%D 2022
