This paper investigates the effects of contract structure and logistics pricing strategies on the profitability and performance of the rose supply chain, consisting of a grower, a third-party logistics (3PL) provider, and multiple retailers. We propose a new collaborative contract—the double revenue-cost sharing contract—implemented simultaneously by the grower with both the 3PL and retailers. Given the conflicting objectives of these supply chain members, game theory is applied to analyze their decision-making processes. Using a numerical example, we examine how this contract structure, combined with different logistics pricing strategies, influences the profitability of chain members and overall supply chain efficiency, with a focus on achieving social goals such as lowering retail price. The results demonstrate that under exogenous logistics pricing, the double contract structure increases profits for all supply chain members, reduces retail price, and improves overall supply chain performance by shortening lead time while preserving rose quality. The findings offer valuable managerial insights for optimizing rose supply chain decisions to enhance profitability.

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